

BEST COPY

AVAILABLE

MORI/CDF pp2-8

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL



6 September 1955

ILLEGIB

TO: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT: Expansion of the Junior Officer Training Program

REFERENCE: Staff Study to DCI from DTR, dtd 30 Aug 55, Subject, "Staffing of Future Intelligence Officer Position Vacancies in DD/I and DD/P"

1. PROBLEM:

- a. To determine how the Junior Officer Training Program can effectively meet the anticipated requirements of the Agency while operating within existing personnel ceiling limitations.
- b. To determine how the Junior Officer Training Program may be expanded in order that the position vacancies created by attrition within the intelligence officer and professional categories may be staffed by properly trained individuals.


2. ASSUMPTIONS:

- a. It was the consensus of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; Chief of Operations, DD/P; Acting Deputy Director (Intelligence); Acting Deputy Director (Support); and the Inspector General that the principles set forth in the referenced staff study are approved. The principles specifically referred to are:

ILLEGIB

- (1) That the Junior Officer Training Program should be continued.
- (2) That the program should be expanded to the extent necessary to

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

meet continuing requirements of the Agency for trained professional intelligence officers.

- (3) That attrition will continue to affect the categories of professional intelligence officers designated in the staff study referred to above.

- b. The personnel ceiling established for Agency headquarters as the on-duty strength on 31 July 1955 will not be exceeded.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

- a. The present Junior Officer Training Program, operating within the presently authorized personnel ceiling, cannot meet the current or future requirements of the Agency for trained professional intelligence officers.
- b. Once a reservoir of trained Junior Officer Trainees commensurate with Agency needs is established, the delay experienced by the operating components of the Agency in restaffing position vacancies in the categories specified in paragraph 3 d of the referenced staff study could be eliminated or reduced to an absolute minimum.
- c. The selection process of the Junior Officer Training Program assures an individual possessing above-average native intelligence. This fact is established during the screening and selection process. During the training period a great deal of additional information is developed about the trainee's qualifications and attitudes. Frequently the members of this program are in competition with other students who possess intelligence or operational experience. Despite this, the JOTs training record must be acceptable or he is dropped from the program.
- d. The Junior Officer Training Program is manifestly not an entity of itself. The staff that operates it encumbers only four established positions within the Office of Training. The positions encumbered by the JOTs are in fact only temporarily encumbered while the individuals are undergoing training.
- e. It is accepted practice among military services to provide spaces within their service schools and provide an over-strength in their training units, since it is obvious that the encumbents in these positions will be absorbed in regular units with established tables of organization, following the completion of their training or be washed out before being assigned.
- f. The actual on-duty strength of Agency personnel is never static. This fluctuation is brought about through rotation, reassignment, transfers from headquarters to the field, promotion and attrition in all of its forms. Concurrent with these changes, there is the continuing procurement of new personnel extending through various stages of processing.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

ET

This situation clearly establishes the improbability that the authorized personnel ceiling for CIA headquarters will at any given time, exactly coincide with the on-duty strength of the Agency.

- g. The personnel ceiling recommended for the Junior Officer Training Program in paragraphs 5 d and e of the referenced staff study represents approximately [REDACTED]

25X1
25X1

[REDACTED] Considering the time required to bring new JOs into the program and the fact that trainees already in the program are being continually transferred into professional vacancies or lost through attrition, it will take considerably more than a year for the program to expand to a point where it can provide for the attrition of intelligence officer and other professional categories.

- h. One obvious method of expanding the Junior Officer Training Program would be to transfer positions from other components of the Agency. At the same time this would result in reducing the capacity of the component releasing such positions.

4. DECISION:

- a. The Junior Officer Training Program has, like other activities of the Agency, experienced attrition in the past. A statistical analysis of this attrition is shown in Tab A. The underlying reasons for these separations may be understood if the following factors are kept in mind. The quality of individual attracted to the Agency through this program is representative of the type of individual being sought by industry, the professions and every other government Agency. In most instances these individuals are still in their formative years and have not fully decided upon the careers they wish to pursue. Once the individual has completed his training and finds himself in an operational assignment under a supervisor who imposes restrictions on his usefulness or who fails for one reason or another to exploit his capabilities dissatisfaction begins to set in. In some of these cases it has been possible to arrange transfers of these young men to a more productive assignment; however, it has been found that a number of JOT separations have come about as a result of improper supervision. There have been also a number of separations due to the individual's desire to take advantage of the GI Bill of Rights for further education upon completion of his military training. Other reasons for separation are indicated in Tab A.
- b. The on-duty strength of the Agency has in the past not come up to the personnel ceiling established by the Director of Central Intelligence. Limitations affecting personnel recruitment and placement combined with attrition and other personnel changes have all contributed to this situation. It is logical to assume that this same condition will continue to exist in the future.

SECRET

SEL

CONFIDENTIAL

- c. There are a number of ways in which the Junior Officer Training Program might be expanded within the existing personnel ceiling of the Agency in order that the future vacancies created by attrition in the intelligence officer and other professional categories may be staffed by trained, fully qualified individuals. The following ways are suggested:
- (1) A transfer of positions from other Agency programs or components. This would involve a thorough analysis of the Agency table of authorization to determine surplus positions while making a comparison of present and future values of the program under review.
 - (2) An arbitrary levy of a requirement for a predetermined number of positions from each of the Agency components utilizing the Junior Officer Training Program. This levy could be restricted to position vacancies as they developed by attrition.
 - (3) Identification of specific categories of operating positions against which double recruitment would be authorized as position vacancies developed.
- d. It is considered possible to increase the authorized ceiling for the Junior Officer Training Program without exceeding the authorized personnel ceiling for the Agency. For example, by double slotting the recruitment of JOs and reviewing on a semi-annual basis the on-duty strength of the Junior Officer Training Program to insure that it does not exceed either 25X1 for the Agency or 50% of the Agency position vacancies existing at the time, the ceiling for this program can be both expanded and controlled without placing the Agency in the position of being over-strength.
- e. Another method for expanding the capacity of the Junior Officer Training Program would be to establish a personnel ceiling commensurate with 80% of specifically designated professional intelligence officer vacancies created during the preceding year. Taking the factor of attrition experienced during fiscal year 1955 as an example, this amounted to approximately 200 separations. In order to phase the buildup of the program, it is suggested that the present JOF personnel ceiling be increased by 25% or 50 positions during fiscal year 1956 with an additional 25% increase projected for 1959 and 1960, thereby establishing a projected ceiling for the program of approximately 200 spaces. This method could also be subjected to a semi-annual review to insure that the capacity of the program is properly aligned with the attrition factor experienced by the Agency in subsequent years. Both of these methods envisage the use of double slotting against actual position vacancies existing in those components of the Agency making use of the Junior Officer Training Program.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. CONCLUSIONS:

- a. The Junior Officer Training Program should be expanded in order to develop the capacity for prompt staffing of certain categories of positions within CIA as attrition in these categories occurs.
- b. It would be impossible for the Junior Officer Training Program to immediately expand its capacity in order to accomplish the proposal stated above.
- c. The method adopted for the expansion of the capacity of the Junior Officer Training Program should not penalize the capacity of other Agency components.
- d. Either of the proposed methods described in paragraphs 4 d and e above could effectively expand the Junior Officer Training Program within existing Agency personnel ceiling limitations.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. That the Director of Training be authorized to recruit and enter on duty candidates for the Junior Officer Training Program within a flexible personnel ceiling established on the basis of Agency requirements as reflected by the attrition of its professional employees.
- b. That one of the plans described in paragraph 4 above be approved in principle with the understanding that the details of implementing the plan will be worked out by the Office of Training in coordination with the Management Staff, DD/S, and the Office of Personnel.

MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training

ANNEX:
Tab A

ILLEGIB

OTR/FIS

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - DD/S
- 1 - DD/I
- 1 - DD/A
- 1 - IG
- 1 - DTRV
- 1 - C/OTR/ER
- 1 - C/PR/ER

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAB
A

~~SECRET~~
TAB A~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Chart IProgram Statistics

	<u>Inductions</u>	<u>Resignations</u>	<u>Attrition</u> (% of Inductions)
FY 1952	63	0	0
FY 1953	55	6	11.6
FY 1954	51	15	29.4
FY 1955	50	23	46
*FY 1956	12	5	41.6
TOTAL	231	49	% of total - 21.2

* 1 September 1955

Chart IIReasons for ResignationResignations Requested:

Security	5
Medical	7
Unsatisfactory Performance	5

19

Voluntary Resignations:

Continue education	8
Private industry	8
Dissatisfied with Agency	6
Military and other agencies	3
Personal (marriage, etc.)	5

30

TOTAL

49

25X1

~~SECRET~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~